After the passage of the
Comprehensive Land Use Plan, cities and municipalities are now faced with the
daunting task of implementing this plan. It is always depressing to hear from
the people involved in the long and tedious planning process that the CLUPs
that they have formulated are just left at the book shelves of the planning
office just to be yellowed by time. Of course, that is never the intention.
CLUPs are not made for compliance purposes of the mandates of the Local
Government Code and the demand for it by the DILG’s Seal of Good Local
Governance (SGLG) Award. If that is the case, then CLUPs would be nothing than
a waste of people’s money, a significant amount of money, in fact, because the
entire planning process which would come in five to six modules up to its
enactment costs a lot of funds, from hundred thousands of pesos to even
millions.
CLUPs are designed to be implemented
as this serves as the long-term road map to genuine development. It is the way
to reduce poverty as it is directed to maximize the usefulness of land in a
city or municipality. It is also an adaptation tool in that it specifically
directs the people to avoid settling in disaster-prone areas and guides them as
to which areas to develop, hence, enhancing their adaptive capacities in the
face of disasters and climate change.
There is no doubt about how
important CLUP is in the quest for development of a city or municipality.
However, the biggest doubt lies in their capacity to implement it. Let us try
to look into how the following CLUP’s tools of implementation actually work and
their underlying issues and concerns.
Here is my take on the Six Tools for
Implementing the CLUP:
1. Zoning. This is the rational way of delineating or
dividing the area into zones or districts based on the four planning areas
which include, production, protection, settlement and infrastructure. As the
Local Government Code of 1991, zoning is the means by which the CLUP is
implemented. Since this is an ordinance, the responsibility for its formulation
and passage lies in the hands of the local sanggunian. The exercise of police
power is necessary to implement this ordinance. Therefore, it is important that
the local chief executive has to have the required political will to have this
ordinance implemented. This is where the problem lies. Reality tells us that
some local chief executives are hesitant to enforce the full force of law as
this might antagonize their supporters who are violators of the zoning
ordinance.
2. Taxation. The Local Government Code gives the LGUs the
power to collect taxes, specifically for this particular discussion, the real
property taxes which include basic real property, Special Education Fund, idle
land tax and special benefit levy. Of these four real property taxes, only the
basic and SEF taxes are being collected. Most LGUs do not have existing policy
mechanisms that enable them to collect idle land tax and special benefit levy.
3. Eminent Domain. This is the power of the state to
expropriate private property for public use upon just compensation. The
government has yet to flex its muscles to maximize the land resources in the
name of public interest. It appears that private developers are more aggressive
in land banking than the government. They go from places to places in search of
developable lands while the government sits idly. Land bank is a good strategy
of the government to accumulate vacant lots that it can reserve for future use like
housing projects, government buildings and public facilities and utilities.
4. Public Investments. The CLUP and the CDP are the main
source of information as to what are the development projects that need to be
establish in a locality. The Local Development Investment Program gives more
specific details to these lists in terms of project description, budget and
time frame. These projects are what are supposed to be funded by the local
budget as well even by higher government agencies in the provincial and national
level. Lack of prioritization, political reasons, lack of budget and lack of
competence at the local level are just some bottlenecks why these proposed
projects are not implemented.
5. Guided private investments. There are a number of
projects that can be effectively carried out by the private sector like
livelihood or microfinance program, tourism development, and public utility
like water or road project. Such projects can help alleviate poverty and
enhance human development in the local level. The challenge for the local
government, however, is on how to make the place attractive for investors. This
can be done by first having a favorable policy environment which include Local
Investment and Incentive Code, improved ease of doing business, anti-red tape
mechanisms, zero corruption and good governance.
6. Co-management of Resources. The Local Government Code
explicitly provides that the local government unit shall “share with the national government the responsibility in the
management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial
jurisdiction.” Strengthening the partnership of the LGUs and the DENR remains a
big challenge. There are times when divergent interests between these two
agencies are evident.
Below is the comprehensive discussion of Professor Serote
in his book Rationalizing Planning System (2008) regarding these tools for implementing
CLUP.
1. Zoning. The CLUP is
primarily a guide for the management by the LGU of its entire territorial jurisdiction.
Zoning, in turn is the guide to the proper location of activities in space
(RPS, p. 152). Zoning has been defined from the early works of the National
Planning Commission to the latest HLURB Town
Planning Guidelines, in terms of its procedural aspect as the division of a city into districts or zones
and prescribing the use regulations for each district or zone (RPS, p. 153).The Local Government Code of 1991 clearly mandates “the
local government units to continue to prepare their
respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning ordinances which
shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources” (sec. 20, LGC).
Later zoning
ordinances, especially those enacted after the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions,
have had the benefit of explicit provisions of law and administrative issuances
as bases of authority in addition to the implicit ones. Both constitutions,
have enunciated the principle of social responsibility in property ownership
and have empowered the State to regulate the “ownership, acquisition, use and
disposition of property and its increments” (Art. XIII Sec. 1, 1987
Constitution).
The rationale
for State regulation of land use is succinctly summarized in another section of
the Constitution, “The use of property bears a social function, and all
economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Individuals and private
groups…shall have the right to own, establish and operate economic enterprises,
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to
intervene when the common good so demands” (Art. XII, Sec. 6).
The authority
to regulate the use of property was subsequently devolved to the LGUs through
the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160). The Code accordingly directs the
legislative bodies (Sanggunian) to “prescribe reasonable limits and restraints
on the use of property within their territorial jurisdiction” (Sec. 447, 458,
468). The basis for prescription of reasonable limits in land use is to be the
comprehensive land use plan and the instrument for enforcing those limits and
restraints according to the CLUP is the zoning ordinance. In short, the zoning
ordinance is the instrument used by the State (through its territorial and
political subdivision – the local government unit) to regulate the use of land
within the LGU territory. And the manner in which the State shall regulate land
use is to “prescribe reasonable limits and restraints” on the way landowners
use their property. This latter point is what most property owners cannot
understand, much less accept. Most property owners believe that their ownership
is absolute. But private property ownership though exclusive is not absolute
but is always limited by the over-all interest of society as administered by
the State. The exercise of zoning by the local government therefore has more
profound political implications than its procedural, if mechanical definition
often suggests. This political implication of zoning must be understood by both
the local legislators and the citizens especially the affected property owners
(RPS, 153-154.)
Political Implication of Zoning
When the local
Sanggunian enacts a zoning ordinance, the legislators must understand that they
are exercising their political power to withdraw from property owners’ bundle
of rights one of those rights namely, the right to develop or use their
property. While they continue to enjoy all the other rights to their property, property
owners can no longer decide on their own what use to make of their property.
The right to use has been transferred from the individual owners to society at
large. Thenceforth, each time an individual wants to use his land he has to
secure clearance from the local government being the administrator of socialized
rights on the use of land. If the local Sanggunian members realize the serious
political implications of zoning, they should ensure that their zoning ordinance
and the comprehensive land use plan of which the zoning ordinance is an
implementing instrument are formulated through a broad participatory an consultative
process so that the plan and the zoning ordinance are the product of social
consensus. For their part, once assured that the CLUP and the zoning ordinance
are the product of social consensus, the citizens will not begrudge the local
government its authority and voluntarily comply with the prescribed limits and
restraints on the use of their property, for the sake of the general welfare
(RPS, 154.)
Proposed Changes in Current Zoning
Practice
Consistent
with the CLUP framework presented in chapter 5, some changes in the current
zoning practice are necessary. The proposed changes will focus on the
geographical and subject areas of coverage and on some emerging zoning district
categories not yet adequately covered by present guidelines.
a. Comprehensive Scope. The new
zoning shall now cover the entire territorial jurisdiction of the LGU and not
focus only on the urban area as is the current practice. Urban land use
regulations shall also extend to barangay settlement centers outside the
Poblacion, or in each of the identified growth centers in accordance with the
chosen urban form. In case there are lands of the public domain and ancestral
domains occurring in the particular LGU, the management plans of these domains
shall be incorporated into the CLUP and the policies embodied in those
management plans shall be reflected in the local zoning ordinance (RPS, p. 154)
b. Total Catchment Concept. An
alternative or at least complementary concept is land and water use zoning.
Considering the archipelagic character of the Philippines it is surprising how
we have carried on with land use planning for decades completely oblivious of
the water component of our territory. It was only fairly recently that water
use zonation was attempted for the first time as is the case of the Batangas
Bay. However the water use zonation was undertaken as a discrete activity
without coordination with the land use planning among the LGUs upstream. Yet we
know that the quality of the receiving water body is dependent to a large
extent on the activities in the upstream watershed. There is therefore a
need to have a combined land and water use zoning that reconciles land uses in
the upper catchment with the water quality requirements of various uses of the
receiving water body. In this connection, amendments should be made on the
Local Government Code (Sec. 131, r) and the Philippine Fisheries Code (Sec. 18)
to the effect that the authority of LGUs over their municipal waters should not
be limited to fisheries only. Other water uses in which the LGU may be given
authority to regulate may include tourism and recreation, navigation and
transport, commerce and industry, and the like. When various uses of the
water body are considered the one that requires the highest water quality
should be adopted as the norm in determining the overall quality of the water
body to maintain and that water quality standard in turn will control the type
and intensity of land uses upstream especially when such land uses have the
capacity to degrade the quality of the receiving waters. Indeed, water-driven
land use planning or water-sensitive land-use zoning is an urgent need that is
long overdue in the Philippines (RPS, p.154.)
c. Emerging Land Use/Zoning Problems. There are some problematic situations that cannot be easily
resolved by strictly adhering to current zoning guidelines. For example, the
problem of mixed land uses. The convenient practice is to adopt the dominant
use only thereby ignoring the other uses. To be more realistic, both dominant
and associated uses should be taken into account, adopting for this purpose the
ingenious classification scheme devised by the BSWM. This implies that a
new land use type namely, “Mixed land use” shall be accepted as a zoning district
in its own right. To be sure, present zoning practice already promotes mixed
land use by providing a list of uses which may also be allowed in any given use
district. The principal decision tool is the “Zoning Compatibility Matrix”. The
matrix lists all possible land-use activities and indicates whether each
activity is permitted in a given zone, without, with certain, or under special
conditions. The concept behind the zoning compatibility matrix is essentially
sound. But there is seemingly a high degree of arbitrariness in its
construction. Moreover, the same prescribed matrix is applied uniformly in all
areas of the country. To improve its validity and usefulness the matrix should
be constructed by each LGU so that it will truly capture the essence of the
CLUP land use policies, give full consideration for the various dimensions and
nuances of compatibility, and reflect the socio-cultural responsibilities of
the local population (RPS, p. 154-155.)
Secondly, special use zones should be created to
serve as a catch-all category for situations that are hard to pigeonhole under
existing categories. Two related examples are particularly appropriate in this
regard owing to the fact that most urban uses and town centers date back to
colonial times (Spanish and American). Some sections of these towns are either
too old and rundown or are historically or culturally significant. Certainly
both sections deserve special treatment; the former may be a candidate for
designation as a zone for redevelopment and the latter for conservation (RPS, 155.)
A third
example of a problematic situation is how to categorize production areas that
are also treated as protected areas at the same time. This ambiguity applies to some agricultural areas like irrigated and
irrigable rice lands (RA 8435) and coconut lands (RA 8048). Both are obviously
production areas but are covered by protected area policies. So where to
classify these lands? There seems to be more sense in classifying these lands
under the more stringent category that is, protected area. To do otherwise
would frustrate the objective of protection altogether (RPS, p155.)
2. LAND TAXES AS REGULATORY TOOLS
In addition to
zoning, the local government uses other authority-levers to deal with private
property owners such as the exercise of its taxing powers and the power of
eminent domain. In a positive developmental mode the LGU can use its power to
spend, putting its funds directly into public investments and thereby
indirectly influence private investments into the locality.
Taxes on Real Property
There are a number of impositions on real
property ownership in the Philippines:
the basic real
property tax, and the special levies on land such as the special education
fund, the tax on idle lands, and the special benefit assessment. The first two
are the more familiar ones and are used extensively for revenue raising
purposes. The last two are rarely applied but they are effective planning and regulatory
tools when properly utilized (RPS, p.156.)
a. The basic real property tax. Why
should one pay taxes on the land that he owns? This is a question many are not
asking aloud and the answer to it is probably understood by only a few. The
answer begins with the concept of land as a natural resource. As such it is
supposed to be enjoyed free by everyone like they do the air, sunlight and the
rain. But unlike the other natural resources, land has become the subject of
private ownership. And whoever is the owner of land enjoys a bundle of rights
including the right to use, dispose, transfer, and exclude others from enjoying
his property. Because not everybody can own land for whatever reason, then
those who are able to obtain title to land are indeed privileged members of
society. Ownership of land therefore, is less of a right than a privilege.
Hence, the real property tax is a tax not on the use of the land as many are
wont to believe, but on the privilege of owning it. Although the basis of
assessment is the actual use of the land, the tax is levied on the person who
is in possession of the property. That explains why squatters, renters,
lessees, and others enjoying similar tenure, do not pay taxes on the lands they
actually occupy and use. For this reason too, the rampant practice of LGUs
collecting the real property tax from the occupants of timberlands on the
strength of tax declarations is difficult to justify. According to the Forestry
Code (PD 705), the mere issuance of tax declarations to forest occupants is
illegal. Many local officials explain that they are taxing the use rather than
the ownership of land. This is obviously an erroneous interpretation of what
the realty tax is all about (RPS, p. 157.)
b. The special education fund. The
additional one percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the special
education fund (SEF) is similarly a revenue-raising measure the proceeds of
which is exclusively for the maintenance and operation of public schools (Sec.
235, RA 7160). Administered by the local school boards the SEF goes into
financing the construction and repair of school buildings, facilities and
equipment, conduct of educational research, purchase of books and periodicals,
and the development of sports. Local school boards have the exclusive authority
to determine and approve the disposition of the proceeds of the SEF, which is
treated as a trust fund by the local government. Although the SEF is applied on
all taxable property, it cannot be considered as a general tax due to the
specific purpose for which it is intended. Hence, it is properly a special
levy. Strictly speaking, the basic real property tax and the SEF are not
planning tools in the sense that they do not prescribe or indicate the way land
should be put to use nor do they control or limit the location of, or the
direction where development should proceed. The other two special levies,
namely, the tax on idle lands and the special benefit assessment are powerful
planning and regulatory devices when properly applied (RPS, p.157.)
c. Idle lands tax. The idle
lands tax is an additional imposition of five percent (5%) on the assessed
value of lands considered as idle (Sec. 236-239, RA 7160). Idlelands are
defined according to whether they are classified as agricultural or urban. An
agricultural land is deemed idle if it has an area of not less than one hectare
and one half of which is unutilized for agriculture. Exempted from this
definition are agricultural lands planted to permanent or perennial crops with
at least fifty (50) trees to a hectare. Also exempted are lands actually used
for grazing. For urban lands to be idle, these should have an area of not less
than one thousand (1,000) square meters, one half of which remains unutilized
or unimproved. Individual owners of subdivision lots regardless of the size of
lots are liable to this imposition. Likewise, subdivision owners or operators
with individual lots that remain untransfered to lot buyers are subject to this
special tax. The basis for invoking exemption from this special levy includes force majeure, civil
disturbance, natural calamity, or any circumstance that would physically or
legally prevent the owner from utilizing or improving the property in question.
What is the rationale behind the idle lands tax? The obvious justifications for
this special levy are to promote efficient and optimum utilization of land for
the overall benefit of society as well as to curb the practice of speculative holding
of land in anticipation of windfall profits from timely sales. The more
apparent reason for local governments' wanting to impose this special levy is
the prospect of increased real property tax revenues accruing from additional
and usually higher assessments on new buildings, machineries and other
improvements once the erstwhile idle lands are put to productive use. Another
use of the idle lands tax which is unknown to most people, including
responsible government officials themselves, is that of a regulatory device to
influence the pattern and direction of development in accordance with the
desired urban form. The near coercive power of the tax to compel idle property
owners to invest in their property lies in the exorbitant rate of the
assessment which is set at five percent (5%) of the taxable assessed value of
the property in question. Repeated imposition of the special levy on top of the
basic real property tax and the mandatory special education fund will have
effectively wiped out the value of the property in a matter of twelve (12)
years of so. If it seems confiscatory in effect this special levy is intended
to be so, in order to make the property owners realize that it is
counter-productive to keep their land idle or under-utilized. If the idle lands
tax possesses that compelling power then it could be used to intensify
development in the desired areas in accordance with the spatial strategy or the
preferred urban form in the comprehensive land use plan. For example, if the
objective is to achieve a compact urban form by accommodating future urban
growth through in-filling of existing vacant lots and by increasing density in
the inner city rather than converting greenfield sites in the urban fringe,
then the idle lands tax should be imposed on idle and under-utilized lots in
the built-up area. Otherwise, applying the tax generally over the whole
municipal territory will not help achieve the desired spatial outcome (RPS, p.
158.)
A possible
variant of the idle lands tax which is a tool to intensify development in
certain areas designated in the land use plan is a tax on under-utilized
property. Land may not exactly be idle as legally defined. But its current use
or use intensity may be of a lower category than what the market justifies in
accordance with the concept of "highest and best use". For example,
the owner of an inner-city lot continues to hold on to a single-storey
residential house when the rest of the block or district have already converted
to multi-storey residential or commercial development. A useful indicator of
the intensity of development of an urban property is the ratio of the value of
improvements to the value of the land. The lower this ratio the more likely is
the property being used in a sub-optimal manner (RPS, p.159.)
For purposes
of imposing the special levy, a cut-off ratio should be determined so that all
properties with ratios below the cut-off one will be subject to the special
levy. This regulatory device will achieve greater effect if it is applied in
conjunction with a zoning plan that indicates different density levels for
various geographical sections of the city(RPS, p.159.)
Although this
tax is as yet nonexistent, it is a food for thought for present an would-be
legislators at both the local and national levels.
d. Special benefit levy. Another
special levy on taxable real property which has been in existence since 1939 is
the benefit levy or special assessment. Originally issued as a provision of
Commonwealth Act No. 134, this special levy was later carried on in Presidential
Decree 464 or the Real Property Tax Code of 1974. Then in the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160) this special levy again appears in Section 240 - Section
245, inclusive. Despite its long existence in the laws, however, this
imposition has been hardly utilized, partly because some local government
officials are not aware of the existence of such a law and partly because of
the lack of models or precedents to guide those who want to implement it (RPS,
p.159.)
Just what is
the special benefit levy? This is an assessment on lands that are specially
benefited by public works projects, whether these be new construction or
improvements on existing ones. This tax allows local governments to recover as
much as sixty percent (60%) of the cost of the project from contributions by
the owners of the lands that stand to benefit tremendously as a result of the
project in the form of increased land values (RPS, p.159.)
The rationale
behind this special levy derives from the principle of social justice and equity
which requires that anyone who is made worse off by an action o society
deserves to be compensated and anyone who becomes better off by that same
action has to return the undeserved benefit to society. As is currently the
practice in the Philippines, only the "worsement" compensation is
claimed by property owners whose property or parts thereof are the subject of
eminent domain proceedings. The betterment levy to which society is entitled,
on the other hand, remains uncollected by the government. Thus, society is
being deprived of a substantial source of funds to finance most of its
infrastructure projects. This special levy is a veritable gold mine waiting to
be tapped (RPS, p. 159-160.)
The net effect
of applying the worsement compensation without the balancing effect of the
betterment levy is that society ends up being the loser by allowing the
benefited property owners whose property has appreciated in value through no
investments of their own to pocket the undeserved dividends. If the two concepts
are applied in tandem wherein those who are rendered worse off are compensated
and those made better off are compelled to reimburse society for the latter's
investments in public works projects, it may well be that actual payments need
no longer be made in either direction. This scheme is what Americans call
"wipeouts for windfalls".3 Actually, the principle of wipeouts for windfalls is unofficially
being practised in the Philippines. This is exemplified in the rampant practice
of landowners to donate portions of their property for the proposed public
works project in anticipation of greater benefits that the project will induce
or accelerate in terms not only of increased land values but more particularly
in terms of general improvement in business climate and investment
opportunities. Under this unofficial practice however, there is no proper
valuation of the benefits that accrue to either party and no one knows in what
direction the net benefits flow (RPS, p. 160.)
3.EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
Another
inherent power of the State to deal with private property owners is the power
to take back private property for public purposes. To protect private property
owners from arbitrary and abusive exercise by the State of this power, the
Constitution has put up limits or conditions on the government in the exercise
of eminent domain. These are, that the taking is for public purpose, that due
process is observed, and that just compensation is paid to the affected owner
(Art. III, Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution).
The transfer
of privately owned land into the hands of local governments is an important
planning tool. If planning entails public control over the pattern of
development in a given territorial jurisdiction, there is no more effective way
to realize the socially desirable use of certain lands than for those lands to
be in the
possession and
control of the local government (on behalf of the society itself). This
requires more extensive application of eminent domain than the usual
project-specific expropriation for sites, rights-of-way, or easements of
proposed public works projects. Local governments must be able to use their
eminent domain powers to acquire more private property for land banking
purposes. Land banking is the advanced acquisition and consolidation of lands
identified in the comprehensive land use plan as areas for future urban
expansion. In the Philippines it is the private developers who practice land
banking with the undesirable outcome that land becomes speculatively priced when
released by them in the market. This practice renders land for urban
development inaccessible to the poor. Even the government often falls victim of
speculative pricing when it acquires land for public use through negotiated
purchase. It is therefore highly desirable for local governments to practice
land banking to be able to curb speculative pricing of development land and to
control the pace and timing of the development in accordance with the plan
(RPS, p160-161.)
The
justification for local governments to practice land banking is implied in the
expanded purpose for the exercise of eminent domain as mandated by the Local
Government Code, namely, “… for the benefit of the poor and the
landless..." (Sec. 19, RA 7160). The addition of this phrase among the
purposes for which eminent domain could be exercised leaves no doubt that land
delivery to local governments especially for developing projects that directly
benefit the poor such as low-cost housing is a legitimate public purpose. To
satisfy this mandate, local governments rather than the private developers
should engage in land banking (RPS, p. 161.)
4. PUBLIC INVESTMENT PROGRAMMING
Whereas zoning
ensures that projects are located in the right place the projects subject to
zoning regulation are often identified or initiated by the private sector and
are not always of the right type in the sense of being socially acceptable.
Hence, there is a need to supplement zoning with another authority-lever:
public investment.
Investment in
public infrastructure and facilities is a powerful tool to shape local
development in accordance with the chosen urban form in the CLUP. When public
facilities such as roads and bridges, schools, public buildings, water supply
systems, or waste disposal facilities have been established these have the
potential to shape the pattern of land use for decades. This ability to shape
future development is due not only to the fact that once the facilities are
built they are not easy to modify. Public facilities can also shape development
in that they strongly influence private investment in the desired direction.
Public investment therefore is a double-edged authority-lever. It improves the
quality of public services and at the same time it influences private sector
investment. When both the public and private sectors are investing in the
community the synergistic effect created will redound to higher levels of
social and economic well being of the population (RPS, p. 161.)
The
preparation of the medium term and annual public investment programs is one of
the functions of the Local Development Council as mandated in the Local
Government
Code (Sec. 109,a,2, RA 7160). The CLUP is a rich source of programs and
projects to be included in the investment program. Public investment
programming is an intermediate process that links the plan to the local budget.
With a functional local development investment program (LDIP) translated into
its annual component (AIP), local budgets can truly operationalize the approved
local development plan as directed by the Code (Sec. 305,I, RA 7160) (RPS,
p161.)
With projects
taken out of the CLUP and the comprehensive development plan, no longer can the
present practice of plucking projects from out of nowhere be sustained. At any
rate, the choice of programs and projects to be included in the
investment program should be guided by the
following principles:
1. Put emphasis on asset-forming expenditures. The broader concept of
"asset" includes both hard and soft projects. Hard projects involve
acquisition of land and construction of physical structures that form part of
the community's capital buildup. Soft projects, on the other hand, pertain to
direct investment in people, which are the most important assets of any
community. Public investment in skills training, scholarships, and public
health are examples of soft projects that are no less important than infrastructure
projects (RPS, p. 162.)
2. Enhance the strategic nature of public investments. Public investment
projects must not only lead to improved public services in general. They must
be able to influence or leverage substantial private investments in order to
accelerate and expand the community's capital build-up thereby multiplying the
benefits that will accrue to the inhabitants (RPS, p. 162.)
3.
Strengthen the spatial basis of the investment
program. Projects, especially of
the
"hard" type should support the realization of the desired spatial
strategy in the CLUP. Henceforth, public investment projects should be chosen
according to their potential to shape the physical development of the city in
accordance with the desired urban form (RPS, p. 162.).
4. Limit projects to those "owned" by the LGU. The projects
that will be included in the LDIP/AIP should only be those owned by the LGU or
those for which the LGU is solely or principally responsible. Although projects
identified and implemented by higher-level agencies must be taken into
consideration at the local level, such projects are already included in the
programs of those higher agencies so it is superfluous to have them included in
the LDIP. The "local" character of the projects need not be confined
to small low-budget ones. Local projects may include large multi-year
developments, given the enabling authority of continuing appropriations (Sec.
322, RA 7160). One useful guide in determining local ownership of programs and
projects is the enumeration of basic services devolved to LGUs (Sec. 17, RA
7160) (RPS, p. 162.)
5. Improve local fiscal management. Current investment programming
practice has invariably followed the conservative track of fitting the number
of projects
to the funds available. The implementation of the CLUP and the CDP
requires
more funds
than what are normally available from regular revenue sources. This would
suggest the adoption of bold non-conventional approaches to fiscal management,
including but not limited to, raising more revenues by improving collection
efficiency in certain items where the LGU tends to under-perform keeping strict
and judicious watch on expenditures, tapping hitherto unutilized revenue
raising powers such as imposing special levies on real property, and exploring
the feasibility of applying the various modes of credit financing as enumerated
in the Local Government Code (Sec. 297-303) (RPS, p. 162-163.)
6. Stress on participatory, consultative process. Notwithstanding the
long list of programs and projects already identified in the CLUP, and despite
the highly participatory process applied in the formulation of the plan itself,
there may still be some important ideas that had escaped notice the first time
around. Every opportunity should be given to all sectors and areas of the LGU
constituency to have their ideas heard on all matters that affect their lives(RPS,
p. 163.)
5. GUIDED PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
Yet another
authority-lever available to the LGU is the mandate to put in place measures to
attract private investments. The rationale for such intervention measures
derives from two realities. First, the magnitude of investible resources in the
possession of the private sector is much greater than that of the public sector
especially at the local level. Significant local development can be achieved
better with the private sector investing in the area in such amounts as would
constitute multiples (rather than mere fractions) of the public sector
investment(RPS, p. 163.)
Secondly,
private investments left unguided may lead to unsatisfactory social outcomes.
Private investors are not known to give prominent consideration for the general
welfare as a factor in their decision-making. State intervention in private investment
decisions is therefore necessary to promote distributive justice, social equity,
and the general welfare (Art. XII, Sec. 6, Constitution) (RPS, p. 163.)
The authority
to guide private investments is given to the Local Development Council (Sec.
109,a,4, RA 7160). Such guidance could take the form of incentives to promote
the inflow and direction of private investment capital. Such incentives in turn
consist of tax breaks, selective subsidies, and reducing transaction costs like
the setting up of one-stop shops and eliminating bureaucratic red tape and
graft and corruption. With public and private investments complementing each
other the benefits that will accrue to the citizens will be multiplied many
times over (RPS, p. 163.)
6. CO-MANAGEMENT OF OTHER DOMAINS
All of the
above discussions pertain to the power of the LGU to regulate the use of land
in private property ownership. What about land and other natural resources which
are traditionally part of the public domain and the ancestral domain which are under
the responsibility of the national government? Does the LGU have powers and responsibilities
over such areas within its territorial jurisdiction? (RPS, p. 163.)
It was noted
earlier that one of the operative principles of decentralization enunciated in
the Local Government Code is that "local government units shall share with
the national government the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction" (Sec. 3,i, RA
7160). Local governments and the national government are therefore directed by
the Code to act as co-managers of the national territory and patrimony (RPS, p
163-164.)
In pursuance
of this principle, the Code empowers the Mayor to "adopt measures to
safeguard and ensure land, mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the
city..." (Sec. 445,b,3,vii, RA 7160). The Code also directs the local
Sanggunian to: "Protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of
natural resources products and endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and
burn farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration
of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance" (Sec.
447, 458, 468, RA 7160) (RPS, p 164.)
In the spirit
of co-management, the LGU can use the CLUP as the basis for crafting a
memorandum of agreement or similar instrument with the DENR or its relevant
service bureaus to jointly manage all natural resources. Similarly, LGUs may
forge agreements with the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
representing specific indigenous groups to share responsibility in the planning
and management of ancestral domains located within the territorial jurisdiction
of the LGU (RPS, p 164.)
Reference:
Rationalizing
the Local Planning System, First Edition 2008, DILG-BLGD
